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Performance in Low-Income Areas 
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SBA guaranteed-lending programs are one of many government-sponsored market interventions aimed at 
promoting small business.  The rationale for providing SBA loan guarantees is often based on the 
argument that they reduce credit rationing in low-income markets for small business loans. In this paper 
we empirically test whether SBA-guaranteed lending has a greater impact on economic performance in 
low-income markets.  Using local labor market employment rates as our measure of economic 
performance, we find evidence consistent with this proposition.  In particular, we find a positive and 
significant correlation between the average annual level of employment in a local market and the level of 
SBA-guaranteed lending in that local market.  And, the intensity of this correlation is relatively larger in 
low-income markets.  Indeed, one interpretation of our results is that this correlation is positive and 
significant only in low-income markets.   This result has important implications for public policy in 
general and SBA-guaranteed lending in particular. 
 
Keywords: low income areas, employment rates, small business, credit markets,   loan guarantees,  
credit rationing 
JEL classification:  G38, H81, O16 
 
 
 1.  Introduction 
  It is a well documented finding in the economics literature that economic growth 
and financial market development tend to be positively correlated.  However, whether 
relatively higher levels of financial development actually cause higher levels of economic 
performance, or higher levels of economic performance cause higher levels of financial 
development, is an issue of debate that dates at least to the studies of Schumpeter (1911) 
and Robinson (1952).     
  Three important recent studies provide evidence that relatively higher levels of 
financial market development do indeed tend to lead to higher levels of one measure of 
economic performance.  That is, higher rates of economic growth.  Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1996), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004), all report 
significant evidence supporting the proposition that the causal relationship runs from 
more financial market development to more economic growth.  All of these papers are 
very careful to develop reasonable structural instruments to proxy for the relative amount 
of local financial market development. 
  In this paper, we investigate whether local financial market development helps to 
promote economic performance by focusing on a particular rationale for such a 
relationship.  That rationale is financial market development may increase the amount of 
external finance available to small firms.  Specifically, we examine whether a 
government intervention aimed at increasing small firms’ access to bank credit has a 
relatively greater impact in low-income areas.  We exploit the fact that there is a strong 
positive correlation between low-income markets and markets with relatively low levels 
of financial development.  And, we use SBA guaranteed lending as our government invention method.  We choose the small firm credit market because of the high degree of 
information asymmetry that may be associated with it.  And, because this information 
asymmetry may lead to a credit rationing problem as explained in Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981). 
  We choose the SBA guaranteed lending program because our previous research 
(Craig, Jackson, and Thomson, 2006) suggests that SBA guaranteed lending has a small 
positive influence on the rate of economic growth in local geographic markets.  Our 
previous research used MSAs and non-MSA counties to represent local geographic 
financial markets.  However, Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2006) did not investigate 
whether a positive relationship between SBA guaranteed lending and other measures of 
economic performance existed.  Nor did we investigate whether these relationships were 
different for low-income markets.  Here we use the level of labor market employment, or 
the employment rate, as our measure of economic performance.  And, we test whether 
SBA guaranteed lending has a differential impact for low-income markets. 
  Therefore, in this paper, our null hypothesis is that SBA guaranteed lending does 
not impact low-income markets differently than higher income markets.  And, our 
primary alternative hypothesis is that SBA guaranteed lending has a greater impact on the 
employment rate in low-income markets.  This alternative hypothesis is predicated on 
priors related to four overlapping assumptions.  These four assumptions are:  (1) income 
levels proxy for relative development of the local financial market, (2) less developed 
financial markets are more likely to experience severe information asymmetry problems, 
and as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out, that could lead to credit rationing, (3) SBA 
guaranteed lending is likely to reduce these credit rationing problems -- thus, improving 
  2the level of development of that local financial market, and (4) increased financial 
development helps to lubricate the wheels of economic performance and increase the 
effective level of labor utilization, or the employment rate (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
  Our results suggest that low-income markets are positively impacted by SBA 
guaranteed lending.  Moreover, the impact for low-income markets is significantly larger 
than it is for higher income markets.  This result has important implications for public 
policy in general and SBA guaranteed lending in particular. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we provide 
some background on small business credit markets and economic performance.  In 
section 3 we provide a brief review of the academic literature on credit rationing and 
relationship lending.  This literature is consistent with the hypothesis that information 
problems in lending markets are particularly severe in the small firm credit market and 
hence provides a rationale for SBA loan guarantees.  An overview of SBA lending 
programs is presented in section 4.  Section 5 outlines the data, our hypotheses and 
empirical strategy.  The results appear in section 6.  Finally, our conclusions and future 
research questions are outlined in section 7. 
 
  32.  Background on small business credit markets and economic growth 
The promotion of small businesses is a cornerstone of economic policy for a large 
number of industrialized countries.  Public support for small enterprise appears to be 
based on the widely held perception that the small business sector is an incubator of 
economic growth, a place where innovation takes place and new ideas become 
economically viable business enterprises.  In addition, policymakers routinely point to 
small businesses as important sources of employment growth.  It is not surprising, then, 
that there is widespread political support for government programs, tax breaks, and other 
subsidies aimed at encouraging the growth and development of small business in the 
United States, and increasingly, around the world. 
A particular area of concern for policymakers is whether small businesses have 
access to adequate credit.  After all, a lot of small firms are relatively young and have 
little or no credit history.  Lenders may also be reluctant to fund small firms with new and 
innovative products because of the difficulty associated with evaluating the risk of such 
products.  These difficulties are classic information problems—problems obtaining 
sufficient information about the parties involved in a transaction—and they may prevent 
otherwise creditworthy firms from obtaining credit.  If information problems are 
substantial, they can lead to credit rationing, that is, loans are allocated by some 
mechanism other than price.  If small businesses face credit rationing, the next Google, 
Microsoft, or Starbucks might wither on the vine for want of funding.  To the extent that 
credit rationing significantly affects small business credit markets, a rationale exists for 
supporting small enterprises through government programs aimed at improving small 
business access to credit.  
  4One specific government intervention aimed at improving the private market’s 
allocation of credit to small enterprises is the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
guaranteed lending program.  SBA loan guarantees are well established, and their volume 
has grown over the past decade.  Nearly 20 million small businesses have received direct 
or indirect help from one or another of the SBA’s programs since 1953.  The SBA's 
business loan portfolio of roughly 240,000 loans was worth about $60 billion in 2004, 
making it the largest single financial backer of small businesses in the United States.  To 
place this amount in perspective, consider that in June 2004 commercial banks reported a 
total of about $522 billion dollars of small business loans outstanding (SBA, 2005).  
Thus, SBA guaranteed loans represented over 10% of total commercial bank small 
business loans outstanding at that time.  And, commercial banks provide the majority of 
small business credit supplied in the USA.  
Over the period 1991 to 2000, the SBA assisted almost 435,000 small businesses 
obtain more than $94.6 billion in loans, more loan volume than in the entire history of the 
agency before 1991.  No other lender in this country has been responsible for as much 
small business financing as the SBA has during that time (SBA, 2004).  These lending 
numbers are remarkable when one considers that SBA loan guarantees are aimed at that 
segment of small business borrowers that presumably would not otherwise have access to 
credit.  It is interesting that the dramatic growth in SBA loan guarantees over the past 
decade has occurred at a time when advances in computer and communications 
technology have substantially reduced information costs in the economy.  To the extent 
that technological innovation has improved the informational efficiency of credit 
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lending has occurred at a time when the benefits of SBA guarantees should be declining. 
The rationale for SBA guarantees appears to be that credit market imperfections 
can result in small enterprises being credit rationed—particularly for longer-term loans 
for purposes such as capital expansion.  If SBA loan guarantees indeed reduce credit 
rationing in the markets for small business loans, then there should be a relationship 
between measures of SBA guaranteed lending activities and economic performance.  
And, this is what we found in Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2006).  In particular, we 
found a positive (although small) and significant relationship between the level of SBA 
lending in a local market and future per capita income growth in that market.  Overall, 
our empirical results were consistent with a positive impact on social welfare of SBA 
guaranteed lending. 
  In this paper we use a simplified version of the analysis in Craig, Jackson, and 
Thomson (2006) to evaluate a potential determinant of economic performance in low-
income communities.  Specifically, we test whether SBA guaranteed lending to small 
firms has a relatively greater impact on the average level of labor employment in low-
income local markets.  We find that it does. 
  In the next section, we provide a brief discussion of the economics of small firm 
credit markets.  This discussion focuses on a highly select group of theoretical and 
empirical articles that help explain the severe credit allocation problems caused by 
imperfect information in small firm credit markets.  These articles also provide insight 
into the mechanism that allow a government intervention, such as the SBA guaranteed 
lending program, to result in higher economic performance in low-income markets. 
  63.  The economics of small firm credit markets 
The economic justification for any government-sponsored small business lending 
program or loan guarantee program must rest on a generally acknowledged failure of the 
private sector to allocate loans efficiently.  Absent such a clearly identified problem with 
private sector lending to small businesses, the SBA’s activities would simply seem a 
wasteful, politically motivated subsidy to this sector of the economy. 
Many economists, most notably Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss (1981), 
contend that private lending institutions may indeed fail to allocate loans efficiently 
because of fundamental information problems in the market for small business loans.   
These information problems may be so severe that they lead to credit rationing and 
constitute the failure of the credit market.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that banks 
consider both the interest rate they receive on the loan and the riskiness of the loan when 
deciding to make a loan.  But the lack of perfect information in loan markets may cause 
two effects that allow the interest rate itself to affect the riskiness of the bank’s loan 
portfolio.  When the price (here, the interest rate) affects the nature of the transaction, it is 
unlikely that a price will emerge that suits either the available buyers or sellers (that is, no 
price will “clear the market”). The first effect, adverse selection, impedes the ability of 
markets to allocated credit using price by increasing the proportion of high risk borrowers 
in the set of likely borrowers.  The second effect, moral hazard, reduces the ability of 
prices to clear lending markets because it influences the ex post actions of borrowers.   
The adverse selection effect is a consequence of different borrowers having 
different probabilities of repaying their loans.  The expected return to the bank on a loan 
obviously depends on the probability of repayment, so the bank would like to be able to 
  7identify borrowers who are more likely to repay.  But it is difficult to identify such 
borrowers.  Typically, the bank will use a variety of screening devices to do so.  The 
interest rate that a borrower is willing to pay may act as one such screening device.  For 
example, those who are willing to pay a higher interest rate are likely to be, on average, 
worse risks.  These borrowers are willing to borrow at a higher interest rate because they 
perceive their probability of repaying the loan to be lower.  So, as the interest rate rises, 
the average “riskiness” of those who are willing to borrow increases, and this may 
actually result in lowering the bank’s expected profits from lending.  
Similarly, as the interest rate and other terms of the contract change, the behavior 
of the borrower is likely to also change.  For instance, raising the interest rate decreases 
the profitability of projects which succeed.  Higher interest rates may thus induce firms to 
undertake riskier projects – projects with lower probabilities of success but higher 
payoffs when successful.  In other words, the price a firm pays for credit may affect its 
investment decisions.  This is the moral hazard problem. 
As a result of these two effects, a bank’s expected return may increase less for an 
additional increase in the interest rate; and, beyond a certain point may actually decrease 
as the interest rate is increased.  Clearly, under these conditions, it is conceivable that the 
demand for credit may exceed the supply of credit in equilibrium. Although traditional 
analysis would argue that in the presence of an excess demand for credit, unsatisfied 
borrowers would offer to pay a higher interest rate to the bank, bidding up the interest 
rate until demand equals supply, it does not happen in this case.  This is because the bank 
would not lend to someone who offered to pay the higher interest rate, as such a borrower 
is likely to be a worse risk than the average current borrower.  The expected return on a 
  8loan to this borrower at the higher interest rate may be actually lower than the expected 
return on the loans the bank is currently making.  Hence, there are no competitive forces 
leading supply to equal demand, and credit is rationed. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that when borrowers are distinguishable, the 
lender may decide to deny credit to an entire group.  This is their classic redlining 
argument.  We expect the likelihood of this type of credit rationing to be higher in low-
income communities.  Furthermore, because the value of collecting information on 
borrowers may be less in low-income markets [because of expectations of less aggregate 
per capita lending], the levels of imperfect information may be higher, in equilibrium, in 
low-income markets. 
Importance of lending relationships 
Kane and Malkiel (1965) come to a similar conclusion about the possibility of 
banks rationing credit.  But they also suggest that the extent of credit rationing depends 
on the strength of existing customer relationships; the size, stability, and prospects for 
future growth of deposits; and the existence of profitable future lending opportunities.  
That is, loans may be rationed to current and prospective borrowers in accordance with 
the cohesion of the existing relationships along with expectations about the future 
profitability of those relationships.  In our empirical analysis, we use the notion from 
Kane and Malkiel (1965) that differences in the relative size of the bank deposit base 
across markets may provide an indicator of the relative degree of credit rationing in that 
local market. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) extended the theory that relationships are important 
factors in determining credit rationing.  They suggest that the causes of credit rationing, 
  9adverse selection and moral hazard, may be more prominent when firms are young or 
small.  However, through close and continued interaction, a firm may provide a lender 
with sufficient information about, and a voice in, the firm’s affairs so as to lower the cost 
and increase the availability of credit.  These authors also suggest that an important 
dimension of a relationship is its duration.  Conditional on its positive past experience 
with the borrower, the bank may expect future loans to be less risky.  This should reduce 
its expected cost of lending and increase its willingness to provide funds.   
Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that in addition to interaction over time, 
relationships can be built through interaction over multiple products.  That is, borrowers 
may obtain more than just loans from a bank.  Borrowers may purchase a variety of 
financial services and also maintain checking and savings accounts with the bank.  These 
added dimensions of a relationship can affect the firm’s borrowing cost in two ways.  
First they increase the precision of the lender’s information about the borrower.  For 
example, the lender can learn about the firm’s sales by monitoring the cash flowing 
through its checking account or by factoring the firm’s accounts receivables.  Second, the 
lender can spread any fixed costs of producing information about the firm over multiple 
products.  Petersen and Rajan (1994) report that both effects reduce the lender’s costs of 
providing loans and services, and the former effect increases the availability of funds to 
the firm. 
Berger and Udell (1995) also study the importance of relationships in the 
extension of credit to small firms.  They find that small firms with longer banking 
relationships borrow at lower rates and are less likely to pledge collateral than are other 
small firms.  These effects appear to be both economically and statistically significant.  
  10According to Berger and Udell, these results suggest that banks accumulate increasing 
amounts of this private information over the duration of the bank-borrower relationship 
and use this information to refine their loan contract terms. 
4.  Small Business Administration loan guarantee programs 
SBA loan guarantees may improve credit allocation by providing a mechanism 
for pricing loans that is independent of borrower behavior.  By reducing the expected loss 
associated with a loan default, the guarantee increases the expected return to the lender – 
without increasing the lending rate.  In the absence of adverse selection, lenders could 
simply offer loan rates to borrowers that reflected the average risk of the pool of 
borrowers.
*   
With the guarantee in place, the lender could profitably extend credit at loan rates 
below what would be dictated by the risk of the average borrower.  The reason for this is 
that the guarantee increases the profitability of the loan by reducing the losses to the bank 
in those instances when the borrower defaults.  To the extent that the loan guarantees 
reduce the rate of interest at which banks are willing to lend, external loan guarantees will 
help mitigate the moral hazard problem.  This is because the lower lending rates afforded 
by external guarantees reduce the bankruptcy threshold and thereby increase the expected 
return of safe projects vis-à-vis riskier ones. Additionally, lowering the lending rate 
increases the number of low risk borrowers applying for credit which, in turn, increases 
the likelihood that the average risk of firms applying for loans is representative of the 
pool of borrowers. Hence, external loan guarantees also help mitigate the adverse 
                                                 
* This is because each loan made would reflect a random draw from the pool of borrowers.  If the bank 
made a large number of small loans to borrowers in the pool then the bank’s loan portfolio would have the 
same risk and return characteristics of the pool of borrowers.   
  11selection problem.    Thus, in theory, SBA loan guarantees should reduce the probability 
that a viable small business is credit rationed.   
Because relationships may be more costly for small businesses to establish 
relative to large businesses, and because lack of relationships may lead to severe credit 
rationing in the small business credit market, some form of government intervention to 
assist small businesses in establishing relationships with lenders may be appropriate.  
However, the nature of intervention must be carefully evaluated.  SBA’s guaranteed 
lending programs may well be a reasonable intervention as they serve as a substitute for 
small business collateral. The program also reduces the risk to the lender of establishing a 
relationship with informationally opaque small business borrowers.  Finally, the SBA 
loan guarantee programs may improve the intermediation process by lowering the risk to 
the lender of extending longer-term loans, ones that more closely meet the needs of small 
businesses for capital investment.  It is interesting to note that the problem of long-term 
credit for small businesses was one of the primary reasons stated by Congress for 
establishing the SBA. 
The legislation that created the Small Business Administration was enacted on 
July 30, 1953.
†  By 1954, the SBA was already making direct business loans and 
guaranteeing bank loans to small businesses, as well as making loans to victims of natural 
disasters, working to get government procurement contracts for small businesses and 
helping business owners with management and technical assistance and business training.  
Recognizing that private financial institutions are typically better than government 
agencies at deciding on which small business loans to underwrite, the SBA began moving 
                                                 
† The act that created the SBA is Public Law 163. 
  12away from making direct loans and toward guaranteeing private loans in the mid-1980s.  
Currently, the SBA makes direct loans only under very special circumstances.  
Guaranteed lending through the SBA’s 7(a) guaranteed loan program and the 504 loan 
program are the main form of SBA activity in lending markets. 
The 7(a) loan program is the more basic and more significant of these 
two programs.  Its name comes from Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act, 
which authorizes the agency to provide business loans to American small businesses.  All 
7(a) loans are provided by lenders who are called participants because they “participate” 
with the SBA in the 7(a) program.  Not all lenders choose to participate, but most 
American banks do, as well as a number of nonbank lenders.  The inclusion of nonblank 
lenders expands the availability of lenders making loans under SBA guidelines. 
 
7(a) loans are available only on a guaranty basis.  This means that they are 
provided by lenders who choose to structure their own loans according to SBA's 
requirements and who apply for and receive a guaranty from SBA on a portion of this 
loan.  The SBA does not fully guaranty 7(a) loans.  The SBA guaranty is usually in the 
range of 50 to 85 percent of the loan amount, and the maximum guaranty is $1,000,000.  
The lender and SBA share the risk that a borrower will not be able to repay the loan in 
full. The guaranty is a guaranty against payment default and does not cover other 
contingencies such as imprudent decisions by the lender (such as underpricing of the 
loan, failure to enforce loan covenants, or failure to perfect a lien on collateral) or 
misrepresentation by the borrower. 
The 504 loan program is a long-term financing tool for economic development 
within a community.  The 504 program provides growing businesses with long-term, 
  13fixed-rate financing for major fixed assets, such as land or buildings, through a certified 
development company (CDC).  A CDC is a nonprofit corporation set up to contribute to 
the economic development of its community.  CDCs work with the SBA and private-
sector lenders to provide financing to small businesses.  There are about 270 CDCs 
nationwide.  Each CDC covers a specific geographic area (SBA, 2004).  
Typically, a 504 project includes a loan from a private-sector lender covering up 
to 50 percent of the project cost, a loan from the CDC (backed by a 100 percent SBA-
guaranteed debenture) covering up to 40 percent of the cost, and a contribution of at least 
10 percent equity from the small business being helped.  The SBA-backed loan from the 
CDC is usually subordinate to the private loan, which has the effect of insulating the 
private lender from loss in the event of default.  Generally, a business must create or 
retain one job for every $50,000 provided by the SBA.  The maximum SBA debenture is 
$1,000,000 for meeting the job creation criteria or a community development goal and 
$1,300,000 for meeting a public policy goal.   Current public policy goals recognized by 
the SBA are: business district revitalization, expansion of exports, expansion of minority 
business development, rural development, enhanced economic competition, restructuring 
because of federally mandated standards or policies, changes necessitated by federal 
budget cutbacks, expansion of small business concerns owned and controlled by veterans, 
and expansion of small business concerns owned and controlled by women (SBA, 2004).   
5.  The hypotheses, data, and empirical strategy  
  One method likely to reduce the costs of asymmetric information based credit 
rationing is to reduce the amount of asymmetric information in these credit markets 
[especially for firms in low-income areas].  One very practical method for doing this is to 
  14encourage lenders to make [profitable] loans that they would not otherwise make.  And, 
in so doing the lender develops a “relationship” with the borrower.  This relationship 
allows for the collection of borrower-specific information at a relatively low cost through 
basic monitoring of the loan.  This reduces future levels of asymmetric information and 
reduces credit rationing by fostering a relationship between the low-income area small 
business and the lending entity.   
  It also encourages the lender to “learn” more about the low-income area in 
general and increases the likelihood of the lending bank making additional loans in that 
area.  This is the [positive] information externality effect discussed in Lang and 
Nakamura (1993).  SBA guaranteed lending may increase the level of local bank credit 
available to small firms in low-income markets by decreasing the amount of firm specific 
asymmetric information in the local financial market and by increasing the positive 
information externality associated with learning about the low-income area.  
Thus, our empirical research focuses on SBA guaranteed lending.  Of course, this 
is only one of the several ways the government promotes small business lending.  For 
example, Federal Home Loan Banks are authorized by Congress to accept small 
enterprise loans as eligible collateral when they extend subsidized advances to banks.  
This provides an incentive to banks to extend credit to small firms because it reduces the 
cost of funding their small business loan portfolios.
‡   
We chose to study the impact of SBA guaranteed lending programs because this 
is where the empirical evidence is likely to be strongest concerning the impact of 
government intervention in small business credit markets.  This conclusion is based on 
                                                 
‡ See Craig and Thomson (2003) for a more complete discussion of the FHLBs’ role in supporting small 
firm finance. 
  15three observations.  First, SBA loan guarantees are more likely to resolve the agency 
problems that give rise to credit rationing in these markets than most other approaches, 
like that of the Federal Home Loan Banks.  Second, SBA guaranteed lending programs 
encompass all types of small business lenders, from community banks and thrifts to 
bigger banks.  And, third, the SBA guaranteed lending programs are relatively large and 
have operated for a long time—more than a half a century. 
We take as our maintained hypothesis that credit market frictions—primarily in 
the form of costly information and verification of a small firm’s projects—can lead to a 
socially suboptimal credit allocation that negatively impacts the labor employment rate in 
the local market. [The implicit assumption here is that labor and capital are 
complements...at least for small firms.]  To the extent that SBA guaranteed lending 
programs mitigate credit market frictions, there should be a positive relationship between 
SBA guaranteed lending and the level of employment, especially across less developed 
[low-income] financial markets. Therefore, we test for whether SBA loan guarantees 
lessen credit market frictions by testing whether a measure of the normalized amount of 
SBA guaranteed lending in a local market is correlated with relatively higher levels of 
employment in low-income areas.  Our null hypothesis is that there are no discernible 
differences in the impact of SBA guaranteed lending on employment rates in low-income 
markets relative to higher income markets. 
Data 
To examine this SBA guaranteed lending and employment rates in low income 
areas hypothesis, we utilize data from three sources.  Our first source is loan-specific 
data—including borrower and lender information—on all SBA-guaranteed 7(a) and 504 
  16loans from 2 January 1991 through 31 December 2002.  A breakdown of loan size, total 
credit and number of loans under each guarantee program is displayed in tables A1 
through A3 of the appendix.  Note that we have over 360,000 loans in our sample.   
Our second source of data, on economic conditions, is from the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) from 1991 through 2001.  Our third source is data from the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s annual summary of deposit data (SUMD) files.   
All of our individual loan data are aggregated to the local market level.  For this 
study, we also aggregate over time to produce cross-sectional observations for our local 
markets.  We use Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) to define the relevant local 
market for urban areas and non-MSA counties as the local market for rural areas.   
Why We Use MSAs and Non-MSA-Counties to Define our Geographic Markets 
  To analyze the impact of SBA guaranteed lending on economic performance; we 
must first define the unit of observation for our empirical models.  In general, because the 
relationship we wish to investigate is a market level phenomenon for credit markets, we 
must consider an appropriate geographic approximation for a credit (or banking) market.  
We desire a measure that reasonably represents an economic market for our cross-
sectional analysis.  By its nature, an economic market should include the spatial clusters 
or geographic areas where the economic agent works, shops, and in general lives.  For 
our research, we consider MSAs and non-MSA counties to be the most appropriate 
geographic proxy for a banking market.  There are at least three reasons that support our 
use of MSA and non-MSA counties to represent banking markets. 
  17  The first reason is the extant literature.  For example, studies by Rhoades (1982), 
Berger and Hannon (1989), Calem and Carlino (1991), Jackson (1992, 1996), Shaffer 
(1994, 2004), Berger (1995), and Dick (2005), and others use MSAs and/or non-MSA 
counties as the proxy for geographically distinct banking markets.   
  The second reason is that banking regulators use it.  The Federal Reserve Board 
and each of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks use geographic proxies for banking 
markets that are based, to a large degree, on MSAs and non-MSA counties.  The Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation do likewise.  Thus, reporting requirements for banks are 
often based on this geographic banking market proxy. 
  The third reason is that practitioners very often use MSA and non-MSA counties 
as a measure of the relevant banking market.  For example, bankers often compare their 
performance by their proportion of deposits, relative to competitors, in a certain MSA or 
county.   
  We considered census tracts, but determined that they may be too small.  This is 
because it may not be unusual for an economic agent to reside in one census tract, work 
in another census tract, and shop extensively [if not exclusively] in yet other census 
tracts.  We also considered states, but considered that definition to be too large.  
Especially in light of the results from Peterson and Rajan (2002), which suggest that most 
small firms borrow from banks within a few miles of their headquarters. 
For these reasons we believe the MSA and non-MSA county are the appropriate 
definitions to use for a local geographic in this study.   
  18In summary, we focus on MSAs and non-MSA counties because they provide a 
reasonable representation of a geographically distinct local banking market.  We utilize 
this local market based unit of observation because the research question we seek to 
address is based on a market level phenomenon.  That phenomenon is market failure, or 
credit rationing, in the small firm credit market.  Our data set consists of over 2300 cross-
sectional local market observations, each representing annual data averaged over 11 years 
(1991 through 2001).   
Empirical Strategy 
To test our null hypothesis we simplify the analysis of Craig, Jackson, and 
Thomson (2006).  These authors estimate their models using classic Arellano and Bond 
panel regression estimation techniques.  In this study, we estimate a simple cross-
sectional OLS fixed effects regression model that incorporates measures of employment 
levels over our sample period.  Our basic model is:  
EMPR i = α 0 + α 1 PICAP i + α 2 HERF i + α 3 MSADUM i + α 4 DEPPOP i  
+ α 5 SBAPOP i + α 6 SBADEP i + ε i                         (1) 
Equation (1) uses the average annual employment rate over our sample period (EMPR) at 
the local market level to proxy for economic performance.  We are interested in how 
SBA guaranteed lending affects cross-sectional changes in EMPR.  The primary variables 
of interest on the right side of Equation (1) are SBAPOP (the inflation-adjusted total 
dollar amount of SBA-guaranteed loans scaled by population in the local market) and 
SBADEP.  The variable SBADEP is equal to DEPPOP times SBAPOP.  It is a measure of 
the cross-partial derivative, or interaction term, for the impact on EMPR of higher (or 
  19lower) amounts of SBA guaranteed lending at higher (or lower) levels of inflation-
adjusted deposits per capita in a local market [DEPPOP].   This is our main variable of 
interest.  A negative coefficient on SBADEP would imply that the impact of SBAPOP is 
less at higher levels of DEPPOP.  Or, stated differently, SBA guaranteed lending has less 
[more] impact in high [low] income local markets. 
  It is also important to consider the impact of DEPPOP on EMPR.  DEPPOP is 
our measure of financial development, and a proxy for local market income level, as 
cross-sectional per capita income and per capita deposit levels are likely to be 
significantly positively correlated.  Of course, we also use per capita income as a direct 
measure of local market income levels.  This will be discussed in our results section.   
Notice that we use a measure of total deposits [DEPPOP] instead of a measure of 
total credit in the local market.  We do this for two reasons.  First, we cannot construct 
measures of bank lending at the local market level.  Market-level deposit data are 
available, however, from the SUMD data.  And, total deposits should be highly correlated 
with lending.  Additionally, using total local market deposits as an instrument for 
approximating cross-sectional differences in the level of total market lending is consistent 
with previous research such as Peterson and Rajan (1995).  Second, King and Levine 
(1993a) suggest that the local market deposit base is one of several reasonable measures 
of market liquidity and financial development.  
  The deposit market Herfindahl index (HERF) is included in equation (1) to 
control for the structure of the local market.  Constructed at the market level using branch 
level deposit data from the SUMD database, HERF provides a measure of concentration, 
  20and presumably the competitiveness, of the local banking market.  The definitions of the 
variables used in the empirical analysis are provided in Exhibit 1.   
6.  The empirical results 
  Equation (1) is estimated using a simple OLS fixed effects method.  Descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in the regression can be found in table 1, and a correlation 
coefficients matrix in table 2.  Our regression estimation results are presented in table 3.   
Notice from table 1 that our primary variables of interest display large dispersions.  
EMPR, our employment rate percentage, ranges from 98.67 percent to a low of 68.06 
percent, with a mean of 93.67 percent.   
  Our per capita income variable (PICAP) has a mean of $15,562 with a high of 
$36,772 and a low of $6,637 and a standard deviation of $3,080.  Our measure of 
financial market development, local market deposits per capita (DEPPOP), displays a 
very wide range also.  The high for DEPPOP is $106,313 deposits per capita, while the 
low is only $147 worth of deposits per capita, and the mean is $8,314 per capita.  A 
similar story can be told for our measure of SBA guaranteed lending activity.  Per capita 
SBA guaranteed lending (SBAPOP) ranges from a high of $416.39 per capita to a low of 
$0.00 per capita, with a mean of $28.33 per capita over our sample period. 
  In table 2 we present a correlation matrix for our main variables.  There are 
several correlation coefficients in table 2 worth mentioning.  For example, notice that the 
local market employment rate (EMPR) is significantly positively correlated with local 
market per capital income (PICAP), per capita deposits (DEPPOP), and SBA guaranteed 
lending per capita (SBAPOP).  And, that the correlation coefficients for the first two of 
these relationships are rather large. 
  21  The correlation coefficients for our independent variables suggest that 
multicollinearity may be a concern for the relationships between local market per capita 
income (PICAP) and MSADUM, HERF, and DEPPOP.  These and other concerns about 
multicollinearity are evaluated using a variance-inflation-factor (VIF) method.   
  In table 3 we present the main results for our study.  These results are estimated 
using an OLS fixed effects method.  The fixed effects class variable is the state in which 
the local market is located.  Focusing on individual states as our fixed effect allows us to 
control for variations in state specific factors associated with systematic influences on 
employment levels within the same state.  Examples of these state specific factors are 
levels of educational attainment and other human capital measures, technological 
endowment and advancement, and state level public policies designed to influence 
employment rates.   
  The results in table 3 suggest that local market deposit concentration (HERF) has 
a negative and significant impact on the local market employment (EMPR). This is 
consistent with the structure-conduct-performance literature which advocates a negative 
impact of market concentration on economic performance.   
  From table 3, our measure of financial development (DEPPOP) has a positive and 
significant coefficient, suggesting a positive and significant impact on EMPR.  Recall 
that DEPPOP is per capita bank deposits in the local market.  To some extent this is a 
measure of cross-sectional local market liquidity levels.  A similar measure of liquidity 
was used by King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) to proxy for the level of financial 
development across countries.  However, the issue of endogeneity is a concern for this 
variable.  For it could be argued that higher levels of employment cause higher levels of 
  22per capita bank deposits as forcefully as it can be argued that higher levels of per capita 
bank deposits cause higher levels of employment.  However, as mentioned in our 
introduction, recent studies such as Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004), all report significant evidence 
supporting the proposition that the causal relationship runs from more financial market 
development to better economic performance.  Furthermore, this issue of endogeneity is 
not central to our analysis, as we are more concerned with the impact of the interaction of 
SBAPOP and DEPPOP on EMPR rather than the causal linkages between EMPR and 
DEPPOP or between EMPR and SBAPOP. 
  Notice from table 3, that SBAPOP also has a positive and significant coefficient, 
suggesting a positive and significant impact on EMPR.  But, the impact appears to be 
economically small.  For example, if you increased per capita SBA guaranteed lending in 
a local market by three standard deviations (approximately $100) the predicted result is 
an increase in the level of employment by 0.8 percentage points.  Of course, the outcome 
of this example would change to about 1.5 percentage points if we use Model 2 in table 3. 
  Our major variables of interest in table 3 are SBADEP, and SBALOW.  These are 
the interactive variables that represent the impact on EMPR of increasing SBAPOP as the 
level of local market financial development increases. Endogeneity issues for SBAPOP 
are similar to those for DEPPOP. 
  SBADEP is equal to SBAPOP times DEPPOP.  Notice that SBADEP has a 
negative and significant coefficient associated with it.  This suggests that at higher levels 
of financial market development (DEPPOP), per capita SBA guaranteed lending has a 
lower impact on EMPR than it does at lower levels of financial market development.  
  23Given that our measure of financial market development is positively correlated with per 
capita income levels, it is likely to be the case that at higher levels of per capita income 
SBA guaranteed lending will have less of an impact on local market employment rates.  
Or, stated differently, at lower levels of local market per capita income, SBA guaranteed 
lending will have a larger impact on the local market employment rate. 
  This proposition is tested more directly in Model 3.  The interaction variable 
(SBALOW) in Model 3 in table 3 is equal to the dummy variable (LOW) times local 
market per capita SBA guaranteed lending (SBAPOP).  The dummy variable LOW is 
equal to one, zero otherwise, if the local market per capita income level (PICAP) is less 
than the median PICAP in our sample.  Notice that the coefficient (-1.33) for LOW in 
table 3 is negative, large, and statistically significant.  This suggests that, other things 
equal, local markets below the median PICAP experience an employment rate that is on 
average 1.33 percentage points less than the employment rate for those markets above the 
median PICAP.  Of course, this result is consistent with a large positive and significant 
coefficient for PICAP in model 3.    
  Our main variable of interest in model 3 is SBALOW.  Notice that the coefficient 
for SBALOW is positive and statistically significant.  Also notice that for this 
specification the coefficient for SBAPOP is insignificant.  This suggests a large decline in 
the impact of SBAPOP on EMPR at higher levels of PICAP.   
  Overall, the results from table 3 suggest that per capita SBA guaranteed lending is 
significantly positively correlated with the local market employment rate.  And, the 
impact of SBA guaranteed lending on the level of employment is greater in low-income 
markets relative to higher income markets.  These results lead to the rejection of our null 
  24hypothesis.  Recall that our null hypothesis is that the impact of SBA guaranteed lending 
on employment rates in low-income markets is the same as it is in higher income 
markets. 
  Our results are also consistent with the notion that less developed financial 
markets benefit relatively more from governmental interventions in small firm credit 
markets.  This relatively higher benefit is consistent with a credit rationing argument such 
as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), where the intervention serves to ameliorate a market failure 
in the small firm credit market.  More specifically, the results also suggest that SBA 
guaranteed lending will have a larger positive impact on social welfare if it is targeted to 
certain lower income areas.       
Robustness Checks 
  Several robustness checks were performed for Equation (1).  In particular, we 
estimated Equation (1) separately for MSAs and non-MSA counties, using disaggregated 
guaranteed lending variables for the 7(a) and 504 lending programs, and using variables 
for the percentage of guaranteed lending going to manufacturers, the proportion of total 
lending covered by the guarantee, and a dummy variable equal to one if that local market 
received no SBA guaranteed loans.  Additionally, we estimated Equation (1) using a 
stacked regression (OLS) approach with our panel data. 
  All of these robustness checks yielded results qualitatively consistent with those 
reported in table 3.  Additionally, because of the potential for multicollinearity in our 
regressors in Equation (1), we conducted a variance-inflation-factor (VIF) analysis.  Our 
VIF results suggest that multicollinearity was not a problem for the results reported in 
  25table 3.  We also tested the standard errors in our regressions for possible 
heteroskedasticity. 
7.  Conclusions and extensions to our analysis 
SBA guaranteed lending programs are one of many government sponsored market 
interventions aimed at promoting small business.  The rationale for these guarantees is 
often based on the argument that credit market imperfections can result in small 
enterprises being credit rationed—particularly those in low-income areas.  If SBA loan 
guarantees indeed reduce credit rationing in low-income markets for small business 
loans, then there should be a relationship between measures of SBA guaranteed lending 
activities and economic performance, and this relationship should be more evident in 
low-income markets.   
  We find evidence consistent with this proposition in this study.  In 
particular, we find a positive and significant correlation between the average annual level 
of employment in a local market and the level of SBA guaranteed lending in that local 
market.  And, the intensity of this correlation is relatively larger in low-income markets.  
Indeed, one interpretation of our results is that this correlation is positive and significant 
only in low-income markets.    
  However, all of our results should be interpreted with caution for at least two 
reasons.  First, we are unable to control for small business lending at the local market 
level and hence, we do not know whether SBA loan guarantees are contributing to 
economic performance by helping to complete the market or are simply proxying for 
small business lending in the market.  Second, we are not able to test whether SBA loan 
guarantees materially increase the volume of small business lending in a market – a 
  26question that is related to who captures the subsidy associated with SBA loan guarantees. 
Both of these questions relate to a larger question.  That question is: What is the optimal 
level of SBA guaranteed lending in U.S. credit markets.  Future research will seek to shed 
light on this larger question. 
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  31Exhibit 1:  Variable Definitions 
 
Variable    Definition Source 
EMPR  Average employment percentage rate in the local market over the sample period  BLS 
SBAPOP  Average per capita amount of new SBA Guaranteed Lending in the local market over the sample period  SBA, BLS 
HERF  Average deposit market herfindahl over the sample period  FDIC SUMD 
PICAP  Average per capita income in the local market over our sample period  BEA 
MSADUM  Dummy variable equal to one if local market is an MSA, zero otherwise  BEA 
DEPPOP  Average annual per capita bank deposits in the local market over the sample period  FDIC SUMD 
SBADEP  Interactive variable equal to SBAPOP times DEPPOP   
Notes:  SBA -- Small Business administration, FDIC SUMD -- Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Summary of Deposit Data, BEA -- Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
BLS -- Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics (N=2358) 
 
Variable Mean  Min  Max  Std  Dev 
EMPR 93.67 68.06 98.67  3.00 
HERF 0.53 0.03 1.00 0.28 
PICAP  ($000)  15.562 6.637 36.772 3.080 
MSADUM 0.13  0  1.00  0.34 
DEPPOP($000)  8.314  0.147 106.313 6.114 
SBAPOP($) 28.33  0.00  416.39  29.48 
 
 
Notes: EMPR is the average annual employment rate in percentage points over the sample period.  
HERF is the average Herfindahl ratio, calibrated to be between zero and one, in market i over the 
sample period.  PICAP is average per capita income in local market i over our sample period.  
MSADUM is an indicator variable equal to one [zero otherwise] if market i is a MSA 
(metropolitan statistical area).  DEPPOP is the average annual per capita bank deposits in market 
i.  SBAPOP is the average annual amount of (new) SBA guaranteed lending in market i over our 
sample period.  SBAPOP is calibrated in dollars in per capita, and DEPPOP is calibrated in 
thousands of dollars per capita. All dollar amounts are in 1990 dollars. 
 Table 2.  Pearson Correlation Coefficients Matrix   
  (N=2358) 
 
 
 EMPR  PICAP  HERF  MSADUM DEPPOP  SBAPOP
EMPR  --- 
 
       
PICAP  0.44 
(0.00) 
---       




---     






---   






















Notes: P-values are in parentheses.  EMPR is the average annual employment rate in percentage 
points over the sample period.  HERF is the average Herfindahl ratio, calibrated to be between 
zero and one, in market i over the sample period.  PICAP is average per capita income in local 
market i over our sample period.  MSADUM is an indicator variable equal to one [zero 
otherwise] if market i is a MSA (metropolitan statistical area).  DEPPOP is the average annual 
per capita bank deposits in market i.  SBAPOP is the average annual amount of (new) SBA 
guaranteed lending in market i over our sample period.  And, SBADEP is an interaction variable 
equal to SBAPOP times DEPPOP.  SBAPOP is calibrated in dollars in per capita, and DEPPOP 
is calibrated in thousands of dollars per capita. 
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This table provides parameter estimates for Equation (1): EMPRi = α0 + α1PICAPi + α2HERFi + α3 
MSADUMi + α4 DEPPOPi + α5 SBAPOPi + α6 SBADEPi + εi.  EMPR is the average annual employment 
rate in percentage points over the sample period.  PICAP is average per capita income in local market i 
over our sample period.  HERF is the average Herfindahl ratio, calibrated to be between zero and one, in 
market i over the sample period.  MSADUM is an indicator variable equal to one [zero otherwise] if market 
i is a MSA (metropolitan statistical area).  DEPPOP is the average annual per capita bank deposits in 
market i.  SBAPOP is the average annual amount of (new) SBA guaranteed lending in market i over our 
sample period.  And, SBADEP is an interaction variable equal to SBAPOP times DEPPOP.  SBAPOP is 
calibrated in dollars in per capita, and DEPPOP is calibrated in thousands of dollars per capita.  This table 
also provides three variations of Equation (1).  In the first variation (Model 1), the variable SBADEP is 
excluded.  In the second variation (Model 3), the variable SBALOW is substituted for SBADEP.  
SBALOW is equal to SBAPOP times a dummy variable.  That dummy variable is equal to one [zero 
otherwise] if the per capita income in the local market is less than the median per capita income across all 
markets in our sample.  T-statistics are in parentheses. “*” indicates significant at the 1% level.  
“**”indicates significant at the 5% level.  “***”indicates significant at the 10% level.   
 
Parameter Estimates and T-statistics 






























































2 0.236 0.238 0.252 
F-statistic  146.94* 123.59* 114.49* 
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Table A1:  Average SBA Loan $ 
   Urban Rural  Total 
Year  504 7A  Total  504 7A  Total  Sample 
1991  262,159 207,984 213,260 300,958 205,233 213,592 213,345
1992  302,788 244,221 249,582 316,912 232,181 238,305 246,923
1993  325,592 250,624 258,006 346,530 244,144 252,845 256,859
1994  341,261 205,738 218,756 334,919 184,367 195,604 213,855
1995  350,786 150,363 169,179 364,684 125,882 145,227 164,796
1996  376,730 190,938 213,915 341,966 145,963 168,762 206,933
1997  369,753 224,912 238,320 310,629 174,399 188,908 231,171
1998  385,883 236,159 253,764 308,272 199,479 212,395 247,994
1999  412,650 253,674 270,483 335,416 195,475 211,379 263,591
2000  427,095 260,575 277,788 343,140 197,743 213,899 269,633
2001  440,611 241,833 264,551 361,987 195,511 216,531 257,741
Sample  377,773 221,391 237,727 335,527 184,414 199,225 231,391
Source:  United States Small Business Administration and authors’ calculations 
 
 
Table A2:  Total SBA Loans ($000) 
   Urban Rural  Total 
Year 504  7A  Total  504  7A  Total  Sample 
1991  168,044 1,235,636 1,403,680 58,687 418,265 476,952 1,880,632
1992  380,301 3,043,969 3,424,270 96,975 912,007 1,008,982 4,433,252
1993  564,577 3,978,656 4,543,233 148,315 1,125,014 1,273,329 5,816,562
1994  1,015,593 5,761,698 6,777,291 207,985 1,419,439 1,627,423 8,404,715
1995  1,165,310 4,821,247 5,986,557 234,127 916,799 1,150,926 7,137,483
1996  1,727,682 6,204,515 7,932,197 269,811 874,902 1,144,713 9,076,910
1997  1,219,816 7,273,196 8,493,012 199,424 939,313 1,138,736 9,631,748
1998  1,464,425 6,725,796 8,190,221 191,437 919,600 1,111,037 9,301,258
1999  1,521,028 7,908,288 9,429,316 175,423 797,344 972,767 10,402,083
2000  1,319,722 6,984,461 8,304,183 166,766 768,827 935,593 9,239,776
2001  1,238,118 5,266,396 6,504,514 185,699 694,065 879,765 7,384,279
Sample  11,784,617 59,203,858 70,988,475 1,934,647 9,785,575 11,720,223 82,708,698
Source:  United States Small Business Administration and authors’ calculations 
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Table A3: Total Number of SBA Loans 
   Urban Rural  Total 
Year 504  7A  Total  504  7A  Total  Sample 
1991  641 5941 6,582 195 2038 2,233  8,815
1992  1256 12464 13,720 306 3928 4,234  17,954
1993  1734 15875 17,609 428 4608 5,036  22,645
1994  2976 28005 30,981 621 7699 8,320  39,301
1995  3322 32064 35,386 642 7283 7,925  43,311
1996  4586 32495 37,081 789 5994 6,783  43,864
1997  3299 32338 35,637 642 5386 6,028  41,665
1998  3795 28480 32,275 621 4610 5,231  37,506
1999  3686 31175 34,861 523 4079 4,602  39,463
2000  3090 26804 29,894 486 3888 4,374  34,268
2001  2810 21777 24,587 513 3550 4,063  28,650
Sample  31,195 267,418 298,613 5,766 53,063 58,829 357,442
Source:  United States Small Business Administration and authors’ calculations 
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